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A PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION BASED ON THIRD ORDER
LINEAR SEQUENCES
L. EL FADIL
Abstract. Based on third order linear sequences, an improvement version of
the Diffie-Hellman distribution key scheme and the ElGamal public key cryp-
tosystem scheme are proposed, together with an implementation and compu-
tational cost. The security relies on the difficulty of factoring an RSA integer
and on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm.
1. Introduction
In [1], Diffie and Hellman introduced a practical solution to the key distribution
problem, allowing two parties, Alice and Bob never met, to share a secret Key
by exchanging information over an open channel. In [2], ElGamal used Diffie-
Hellman ideas to designe a cryptosystem whose security is based on the difficulty
of solving the discrete logarithm problem. In [3, 5], It was suggested that the
linear sequences can be used instead of the standard RSA.
In this paper, based on the third order linear sequences, an improved version
of the Diffie-Hellman distribution key and El Gamal public key cryptosystem
method are proposed. This considerably reduces the computation cost of these
methods. The security relies on the difficulty of factoring an RSA integer. In
section 2, an investigation of the cryptographic properties of third order linear
sequences, and a computational method and cost to evaluate the kth term of a
third order linear sequence are given. In section 3, two cryptographic applications,
their security and computational cost are analysed.
2. Third order linear sequences
In this section, the main cryptographic properties of third order linear se-
quences are investigated. A computational method to evaluate the kth term of a
third order linear sequence is given, together with an analysis of its computational
cost.
Throughout this paper, p is a prime integer, Fp := ZZ/pZZ the finite field of p
elements, a ∈ IFp and f(X) = X3−aX2 +aX− 1 a polynomial in IFp[X]. Denote
A = IFp[X]/(f(X)) and α = X¯ the class of X modulo the principal ideal of IF p[X]
generated by f(X). For every x ∈ A, let lx be the linear map of A defined by
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lx(y) = xy, T (x) = Tr(lx) and N(x) = det(lx) the trace and norm of x, where
det(lx) is the determinant of the linear map lx, and Tr(lx) is its trace. Define a
sequence s(a) as follows : sk(a) = T (α
k). Since f(α) = 0 and the trace map is
linear, it follows that sk+3(a) = ask+2(a) − ask+1(a) + sk(a). So, s(a) is a third
order linear sequence, called the characteristic sequence generated by a.
Remark. Let lk be the endomorphism of A defined by lk(x) = α
kx, and Mk its
matrix with respect to the basis (1, α, α2). So,
M0 =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
, M1 =
 0 0 11 0 −a
0 1 a
 and M2 =
 0 0 a0 −a 1− a2
1 a a2 − a
 .
It follows that: s0(a) = 3, s1(a) = a, and s2(a) = a
2 − 2a.
2.1. Cryptographic properties. Let f(X) = X3 − aX2 + aX − 1 ∈ IF p[X], 1,
α1 and α2 its roots in a splinting field of f(X), and let s(a) be the characteristic
sequence generated by a. Then we have the following properties:
(1) For every integer k, sk(a) = 1 + α
k
1 + α
k
2 and sk(a) = s−k(a).
(2) For every integer k,
let fk(X)=X
3−sk(a)X2+sk(a)X−1. Then fk(X)=(X−1)(X−αk1)(X−αk2).
(3) For every integers k and e, se(sk(a)) = ske(a).
(4) T = (p2 − 1) is a period of s(a).
Proof.
(1) Since f(X) is the characteristic polynomial of M1, which splits in a splint-
ing field K of f(X), and 1, α1 and α2 are the roots of f(X) in K, there
exists an invertible matrix P in M3(K) such that M1 = PTP
−1, where
T=
 1 x y0 α1 z
0 0 α2
, where (x, y, z)∈K3. Let k be an integer. As Mk =
Mk1 , Mk = PT
kP−1, where T k =
 1 xk yk0 αk1 zk
0 0 αk2
, and (xk, yk, zk) ∈ K3.
Therefore, sk(a) = Tr(α
k) = 1 + αk1 + α
k
2.
Let k be an integer. Since α1α2 = 1, s−k(a) = 1+α−k1 +α
−k
2 = 1+α
k
2+α
k
1 =
sk(a).
(2) Since, sk(a) = 1 + α
k
1 + α
k
2, 1α
k
1 + 1α
k
2 + α
k
1α
k
2 = α
k
1 + α
k
2 + 1 = sk(a), and
1.αk1α
k
2 = (1.α1α2)
k = 1.
(3) The roots of the polynomial fk(X) are 1, α
k
1, α
k
2. So, se(sk(a)) = 1 +
(αk1)
e + (αk2)
e = ske(a).
(4) Since, α is an element of A of norm 1, α is an invertible element of A.
Set f(X) = (X − 1)(X2 − (a − 1)X + 1) and 4 = (a − 1)2 − 4 be the
disciminant of P (X) = X2 − (a− 1)X + 1. Then there are three cases:
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(a) p divides (a − 1)2 − 4. Then a = 3 or a = −1 modulo p. If a = 3
modulo p, then for every k, sk(a) = 3. If a = −1 modulo p, then for
every k, s2k(a) = 3 and s2k+1(a) = −1, and then 2 is the period of
s(a).
(b) If ( (a−1)
2−4
p
) = 1, then f(X) splits in IF p, and α1 6= α2. Thus 1, α1, α2
are pairwise distinct, and then A ' IF p×IF p×IF p. Hence the exponent
of the multiplicative group A∗ is p− 1. So, αp−1 = 1.
(c) If ( (a−1)
2−4
p
) = −1, then A ' IF p × IF p2 . Hence the exponent of the
multiplicative group A∗ is p2 − 1. Thus αp2−1 = 1.
Consequently, αpi = 1. Let k and m be two integers, sm+kpi(a) = T (α
m+kpi)
= T (αm(αpi)k) = T (αm) = sm(a). Hence pi is a period of the sequence
s(a).
Corollary 2. 1. For every integer e such that gcd(e, p2 − 1) = 1, the map
Luce : IF p −→ IF p
a −→ se(a)
is a one-one correspondence.
Indeed, since gcd(e, p2 − 1) = 1, let d be the inverse of e modulo p2 − 1. Then
there exists an integer k such that de = 1 + k(p2 − 1). Therefore, sd(se(a)) =
sde(a) = s1+k(p2−1)(a) = s1(a) = a.
2.2. Computational Method and Cost.
Lemma 2. 2. Let sk(a) be the characteristic sequence generated by a. Then{
i) s2n(a) = sn(a)(sn(a)− 2),
ii) s2n+1(a) = sn(a)sn+1(a)− sn+1(a)− sn(a)− a+ 3
Proof.
i) Since αn1α
n
2 = 1, sn(a)
2 = (1+αn1 +α
n
2 )
2 = (1+α2n1 +α
2n
2 )+2(α
n
1 +α
n
2 )+2 =
s2n(a) + 2sn(a).
ii) sn(a)sn+1(a) = (1 + α
n
1 + α
n
2 )(1 + α
n+1
1 + α
n+1
2 ) = (1 + α
2n+1
1 + α
2n+1
2 )
+ (αn1 + α
n
2 ) + (α
n+1
1 + α
n+1
2 ) + (α1 + α2) = s2n+1(a) + sn(a) + sn+1(a) + a− 3.
Let k= 2rm, where m is an odd integer. To compute sk(a), first we compute
sm(a), then s2m(a) = sm(a)(sm(a)−2), then s4m(a) = s2m(a)(s2m(a)−2),...,sk(a)
= s2r−1m(a)(s2r−1m(a)− 2). To compute sk(a), we need r multiplications modulo
p and we need too sm(a). Let m =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
l−1−i. For every 0 ≤ i < l − 1, let
fi+1 = 2fi + ki+1 and f0 = k0. Then fl−1 = k. For 0 ≤ i < l − 1, assume that
sfi−1(a) and sfi−1+1(a) are computed. So, if ki = 0, then sfi(a) = s2fi−1(a) =
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sfi−1(a)(sfi−1(a) − 2) and sfi+1(a) = s2fi−1+1(a) = sfi−1(a)sfi−1+1(a) − sfi−1(a) −
sfi−1+1(a)− a+ 3 if ki = 1, then
sfi(a) = s2fi−1+1(a) = sfi−1(a)sfi−1+1(a)− sfi−1(a)− sfi−1+1(a)− a+ 3
and sfi+1(a) = s2(fi−1+1)(a) = sfi−1+1(a)(sfi−1+1(a)− 2).
Algorithm of computational.
In put k = 2r
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i, where k0 6= 0 and kl−1 6= 0, out put sk.
Algorithm
Begin
s0 = 2, s1 = a,
for i from 0 to l − 1 do
if ki = 0 then s1 = s1s0 − s1 − s0 − a+ 3,
s0 = s
2
0 − 2s0 else then
s0 = s1s0 − s1 − s0 − a+ 3, s1 = s21 − 2s1
end for
s = s0,
for i from 1 to r do s = s2 − 2s.
end for
return (s).
End.
This method ensures that sk can be computed in about the same length of time
as the kth power is computed in the RSA method. But in the computation of
sm(a), having to compute two numbers at each stage does slow the computation
down a little, but there are optimizations in the calculation which mean that the
total amount of computation is only about half more than the amount needed for
the RSA system. Therefore, to compute sk(a), the total number of multiplications
modulo p is log2(k).
3. Main result
In this section we describe some applications of third order linear sequences, in
more details : Diffie-Hellman distribution key and ElGamal public key encryption
scheme.
Let n = pq be an RSA integer, f(X) = X3 − aX2 + aX − 1 a polynomial in
ZZn = ZZ/nZZ, A = ZZn[X]/(f(X)) and α = X¯ the class of X modulo the principal
ideal (f(X)). Let s(a) be the characteristic sequence generated by a, defined in
ZZn by : sk(a) = T (α
k).
Lemma 3. 3. α(p
2−1)(q2−1) = 1 modulo n. In particular, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1) is a
period of s(a).
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Indeed, α(p
2−1)(q2−1) = (α(p
2−1))(q
2−1) = 1 modulo p and α(p
2−1)(q2−1) =
(α(q
2−1))(p
2−1) = 1 modulo q.
3.1. Diffie-Hellman distribution key. Suppose that Alice and Bob who both
have access to the Lucas function public data (n, a) want to agree on a shared
secret key KAB. This can be done using the following Lucas version of the Diffie-
Hellman protocol:
(1) User Alice selects 0 < xA ≤ n as her private key. She then computes
yA = sxA(a) as her public key from the system public key n and f(X) =
X3 − aX2 + aX − 1.
(2) User Bob selects 0 < xB ≤ n as his private key. He then computes
yB = sxB(a) as his public key from the system public key n and f(X) =
X3 − aX2 + aX − 1.
(3) Key-Distribution Phase: KAB = sxA(yB) = sxB(yA) is their common
secret key.
Remark. That
(1) KAB = sxAxB(a). (2) In each exchange session, the computational cost of
each user is 2log2(n). (3) If an attacker try to compute the Alice’s private key
x from her public key y = sx(a), a polynomial fy(X) = X
2 − (y − 1)X + 1 is
formed. According to the Lemma 1.2, αx1 and α
−x
1 are the roots of fy(X). As a
result, once αx1 and α1 are known, solving the exponent x is equivalent to solving
the discrete logarithm in ZZn, which is much harder than solving the discrete
logarithm in IFp, and then this method improves that presented in [3].
3.2. ElGamal public key encryption. We now explain our improvement ver-
sion of the public key system. It is based on ElGamal system, which is defined
by third order linear sequences.
Suppose Bob is the owner public data (p, q, a). Bob selects a small integer e
such that gcd(e, (p2−1)(q2−1)) = 1 and a secret integer 0 < x ≤ n. He computes
d the inverse of e modulo (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1), y = sx(a) and made public (e, y) as
his public key.
Given the Bob public data (n, a, e, y), Alice can encrypt a message m, where
0 ≤ m < n, intended for Bob using the following version of the ElGamal encryp-
tion scheme as follows:
Algorithm.
(1) Public key: (n, a, y, e)
(2) Private key: (p, q, d, x).
(3) Encryption: For a message 0 ≤ m < n, Alice chooses a (secret) random
number 0 < k < n, and she sends Bob the ciphertext c = (c1, c2), where
c1 = sk(a) and c2 = K + se(m), where K = sk(y).
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(4) Decryption: For a ciphertext c = (c1, c2), Bob computes K = sx(c1), and
then m = sd(c2 −K), where (p, q, d, x) is its private key.
Note that.
(1) All computational are in ZZn. (2) sx(c1) = sx(sk(a)) = sxk(a) = sk(sx(a)) =
sk(y) = K and c2 −K = se(m). (3) Since ed = 1 modulo (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1), there
exists an integer l such that
ed = 1 + l(p2− 1)(q2− 1). As (p2− 1)(q2− 1) is a period of s(m), sd(c2−K) =
sd(se(m)) = sed(m) = s1+l(p2−1)(q2−1)(m) = s1(m) = m.
Security analysis. Because the properties of third order linear sequences mirror
those of exponentiation, public key and private key processes can be developed
in an exactly analogous manner to the RSA system. This enables us to prove
that any successful attack on this system would give a successful attack on the
RSA and ElGamal systems [3]. Thus the security of the method relies on the
difficulty of factoring an RSA integer and on the difficulty of solving the discrete
logarithm in ZZn.
Computational Cost. As in the standard RSA public key system, Bob chooses
a small integer e and Alice chooses a relatively small integer k such that the
computational cost for evaluating sk(a) and se(m) are low. For example e = 5,
we need 3 multiplications modulo n for computing s3(m), in average log2(k)
multiplications modulo n for computing sk(a). Totally, 4+log2(k) multiplications
modulo n for enciphering.
For deciphering, once d and y are computed, we need log2(x) multiplications
modulo n for computing K = sx(c1), and log2(d) multiplications modulo n for
computing sd(c2 − K). As d < n2, we need, 3log2(n) multiplications modulo n
for deciphering. Totally, we need 4log2(n) on average.
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